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We explore two ways of distinguishing the semantic operation of kind terms. First, we 
focus on a distinction between terms with a flexible vs. terms with an inflexible 
semantics. Flexibility depends on whether some changes in the domain of application 
are taken to be possible while being consistent with past usage and what is intuitively 
the same meaning. On the other hand we discuss terms whose mode of operation is 
tolerant, in that the cohabitation in the speakers’ community of more than one use or 
practice of use of the term in question is accepted. Those terms contrast with terms that 
operate in a strict way restricting severely the legitimacy of different uses that cut the 
domain of application in different ways. Among the latter we include terms with an 
ethical component and terms whose correct application involves high stakes. These 
distinctions are not new, since the phenomena that we identify as flexibility and 
tolerance have been observed, although in our view they have not been properly 
systematized and assessed. We argue that the two distinctions throw light on the bases 





In this paper we explore two pairs of distinctions in the semantic operation of kind 
terms. The phenomena we discuss have been observed before; but they have not been 
sufficiently explored, systematized and used to explain the basis of some judgments as 
regards the correctness of application of terms. In section 1 we discuss the distinction 
between terms with a flexible vs. terms with an inflexible semantics. Flexibility depends 
on whether some changes in the domain of application are taken to be possible while 
being consistent with past usage and preserving or refining the  meaning of the term. In 
section 2 we discuss terms whose mode of operation is tolerant, in that the intentions of 
speakers and other factors that bestow meaning permit the cohabitation in the speakers’ 
community of more than one use or practice of use of the term in question, in such a 
way that the different uses cut up roughly the same domain of application in different 
ways. Those terms contrast with terms that operate in a strict way restricting severely 
the legitimacy of different uses. 
 
 
Section 1. Flexibility 
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A fundamental tenet of semantic theory is the claim that the meaning, or intension, of a 
term determines its reference, or extension, or domain of application. This is an 
extremely plausible principle since it seems hardly debatable that what a term means 
determines what it should or should not be applied to. But this principle was for a long 
time interpreted in a rather strong way, understood to mean that whenever a term is 
introduced in the vocabulary of a language and bestowed a meaning, its reference or 
extension is determined once and for all, namely that it is determined for any object or 
any sample past, present or future, whether it is or it is not a member of the extension of 
the term.1 
 
Hilary Putnam, for instance, appears to subscribe to such a strong interpretation of the 
principle in his seminal 1975 paper ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning’’, at least when it comes 
to ‘water’, ‘aluminum’ and other kind terms he discusses: suppose that at time m the 
term ‘water’ is introduced in the language. According to Putnam the meaning of that 
term establishes at that very time whether a sample l of liquid that speakers will 
encounter later at time m’ is or is not water. Applying the term to a sample l that is not 
part of the pre-determined extension is an error and was an error, Putnam contends, 
before anyone knew the microstructure of water.2 
 
The adherence to the strong once and for all interpretation of the principle that meaning 
determines extension, for all terms (and not just for the natural kind terms considered by 
Putnam), was for a long time the default position among semanticists. Mark Wilson 
certainly supposed the interpretation to be pervasive when he contested it in his 1982 
paper ‘Predicate Meets Property’ a paper that is “partially intended as a commentary 
upon Hilary Putnam’s ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning’’ (Wilson 1982: 549). 
 
Jackman (1999) proposes a thought experiment, based on a story discussed by Wilson 
(1982): suppose that s is a member of an isolated community (“the Druids”), that 
inhabit an island in which the class of birds and the class of flying things are 
coextensive. In that community they use the term ‘ave’ to refer to things in these 
coextensive classes, and they all have beliefs such as ‘only aves can fly’ and ‘aves are 
living beings’, which are true of the aves on the island. When s first sees planes in the 
sky, he classifies them, unproblematically, as aves, and when he later sees one landing 
he forms the belief that not all aves are living beings. And, so the practice to apply ‘ave’ 
to planes catches on in the Druid community. Despite the initial lack of clarity derived 
from the fact that Druids had different beliefs associated to the term, they all consider 
that with ‘ave’ they have always referred to things that fly, and recognize that some of 
the previous beliefs they had about aves (e.g. they were all living beings) were false.  
 
But suppose that s had initially seen planes on the ground not realizing that they could 
fly. He might have classified them, also unproblematically, as non-aves. And had he 
afterwards seen them taking off, he would have concluded that not all things that fly are 
aves. Supposing this practice to catch on among Druids, s and other Druids, would also 
have thought that with ‘ave’ they had always referred to birds, recognizing that some of 
 
1 The principle is supposed to apply to singular and general terms. For the purposes of 
the discussion here we leave aside singular terms.  
2 Of course, a change in meaning is always possible. For instance, the error may 
generalize and the community may end up applying ‘water’ to l and similar samples.  
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the previous beliefs they had about aves (such as that only aves could fly) were false. In 
none of the cases, the members of the community see themselves as having changed 
what they meant by ‘ave’. Druids would understand that their current use is naturally 
derived from their previous use. 
 
The example encourages us to think that it is not written in stone whether airplanes 
should or should not be under the extension of ‘ave’, simply because rather accidental 
facts about the way in which airplanes are first encountered have quite a decisive 
influence on the adjustment the Druids perform on their beliefs. In one case, the Druids 
abandon the belief that all aves are living beings, holding on to the belief that aves are 
flying things, thus reaching a consistent set of beliefs and attributions (an equilibrium, 
using Jackman’s (1999) terminology) in which ‘ave’ applies to all flying things, living 
or not. Had s first seen planes on the ground the equilibrium reached would include the 
belief that all aves are living beings, but exclude the belief that only aves fly. This is a 
puzzle case for the, at the time, pervasive strong interpretation of the principle that 
meaning determines extension. According to Wilson (who in his discussion uses ‘bird’ 
instead of Jackman’s ‘ave’): 
 
The traditional response to our problem is to seek the “concept,” “sense,” or 
“universal” the prebomber Druids had associated with “bird” and study the 
extension determined by this intervening entity. A consequence of this account 
is that the Druids in one or both of our alternative stories must have “changed 
the meaning” of “bird.” (Wilson 1982: 551) 
 
But no obvious explanation for what such a change in meaning consisted in squares 
easily with the traditional strong interpretation for this is a case in which both the 
application, and the withdrawal, of the term ‘ave’ to planes appears to be consistent 
with the meaning of the term as it had been used by the Druid community. 
 
The strong interpretation of the principle that meaning determines extension was the 
default position for a long time. It is nevertheless striking that both descriptivists and 
anti-descriptivist felt so committed to it. Take descriptivism. From the descriptivist 
point of view a term has a meaning in virtue of its being associated with a definite 
description. It seems unduly optimistic to expect the description to be sufficiently clear 
and so exhaustive as to delimit all the relevant properties that samples or exemplars that 
come up for classification have to possess. For instance suppose that the description 
associated with a term M is ‘the entities/samples that have properties F, G and H’, when 
an exemplar or a sample that has properties F, G and H, but also property P shows up, it 
is perhaps too much to expect that the description will clearly determine whether P is or 
is not relevant for classification under M and if it is, whether the sample or exemplar 
must be, or not be P. 
 
 It is even more striking that anti-descriptivists following the Kripke-Putnam approach 
would feel such allegiance. The Kripke-Putnam model postulates that the classification 
of things or samples into kinds depends on the similarities to original paradigms. Since 
things are similar and dissimilar in many respects, it seems that it is too much to expect 
that the similarity or similarities that are responsible for classification be fixed, for any 
term, once and for all, at the very moment of introduction. 
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Wilson’s ‘ave’ case is fictional. But there are a good number of real life cases that have 
come to cast doubt on the once-and-for-all stance. David Plunkett and Timothy Sundell 
(2014) have recently discussed a case, brought up by Peter Ludlow (2008) involving the 
predicate ‘athlete’. In 1999 the horse Secretariat  appeared on the ESPN list of the 
greatest athletes of the 20th century.3 The debate that ensued was about whether the 
meaning of the term allowed its application to non-humans. This is an interesting case 
because no matter which theory of meaning the debaters endorsed (descriptivism or 
anti-descriptivism), the debate hinged on whether the meaning of ‘athlete’ definitely 
excluded or included non-humans since its introduction as a meaningful term in the 
language. For if it excluded them, accepting the application of ‘athlete’ to Secretariat 
would constitute a (welcome or unwelcome) break with the previous usage of ‘athlete’. 
 
Now, the application of 'athlete' to non-humans has clearly not gained traction; the 
Secretariat case appears to be rather anecdotal and, as we are using the term nowadays, 
‘athlete’ applies only to humans. Imagine though that, on the wake of the debate about 
Secretariat, it had become common to include horses in lists of athletes. It is not clear 
that such inclusion would constitute a change, neither slight nor radical, in the meaning 
of ‘athlete’. After all the similarity being highlighted as relevant or important that would 
lead us to classify non-humans as athletes seems well within the umbrella of the 
similarities that we use to apply the term.  
 
Contemplating such a possibility is indeed contrary to the presumption that the domain 
of application is fixed once and for all. Reflection on cases such as ‘ave’ and ‘athlete’ 
suggests that the semantics of some terms is flexible in that, at a given point in time, 
when the issue arises as to whether to classify an object or a sample or a phenomenon 
under the term’s extension, there may be more than one open course of action 
compatible with the meaning of the term, more than one course of action continuous 
with previous usage.4  
 
Flexibility should not be reduced to other phenomena. On the face of cases such as the 
‘athlete’ case, it is common to encounter the response that the use of ‘athlete’ 
underlying the ESPN list was metaphorical. Of course, the response goes, had the 
practice become established, the metaphor would have died, the meaning of ‘athlete’ 
suffering a not too radical change (but change after all) adapting to the new usage. 
 
We think, though, that the extremely lively discussion that erupted after the ESPN list 
included horses in their best-athletes list shows that the usage was not meant to be 
metaphorical. No such discussion would have erupted surrounding the metaphorical use 
of other expressions such as ‘the pearls in his mouth’. The discussion was about 
whether Secretariat and other non-humans could be classified as bona fide athletes. No 
such discussion arises as to whether people’s teeth are bona fide pearls. Moreover, as 
 
3 Secretariat was number 35 and there were two other non-humans in the ESPN list, 
both racing horses: Man o'War (number 84) and Citation (number 97). 
4 We could say that flexibility or inflexibility as regards the use of a term t is an 
attribute of the community not of the semantics or the use of the term. But the 
phenomenon has immediate semantic consequences, for it translates into the semantic 
permissibility of alternative paths as regards what is included and what is excluded from 
the extension of t.   
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we mentioned before, in the intended application of ‘athlete’ to Secretariat and other 
horses, the similarity being highlighted as relevant or important, a similarity that would 
lead us to classify non-humans as athletes, seems well within the umbrella of the 
similarities that we use to apply the term. The ‘ave’ case cements also the argument: it 
is clear that in the decision to apply, or not to apply, ‘ave’ to planes, there is no 
metaphorical intent on the part of the Druids. 
 
Semantic flexibility has been acknowledged in different ways and with different 
consequences by different authors. For instance, Joseph LaPorte has argued, against 
Putnam, that “vernacular terms for substances like water or minerals are vague in such a 
way that it is not clear whether a new substance with the familiar superficial features but 
a different microstructure, or a new substance with unfamiliar superficial features but 
the same microstructure, would belong in the extension of a term” (LaPorte 2004: 103). 
According to LaPorte pre-scientific uses of terms are open-textured, and as science 
progresses, it is not determined in all cases whether a term should apply to a given 
sample or exemplar: “Empirical exploration uncovers many plausible candidates” 
(LaPorte 2004: 3). Thus experts do have a choice, and their choice refines a term’s 
meaning.  
 
LaPorte endorses  the view that some terms have what we have called here a flexible 
semantics, proposing that meaning evolves without there being a clean break in usage. 
In that sense he clearly rejects the once and for all interpretation of the tenet that 
meaning determines extension. 
 
Flexibility is also acknowledged by Henry Jackman. Jackman (1999) has argued that at 
any given point in the history of the use of a term there are alternative possibilities of 
extension of the domain of application, alternative equilibria, that are consistent with 
past practice: “A practice can evolve as its characterization of a term’s meaning is made 
more determinate, but it need not actually be viewed as changing unless it settles on an 
equilibrium that was not a member of the set originally accessible to it. As long as the 
practice remains the same, so does the meaning of the term tied to it” (Jackman 1999: 
160-1). Jackman, unlike LaPorte, does not see the alternative possible histories of the 
use of a term as refinements of precisifications of the meaning, but just as preservations 
of meaning. 
 
Different terms or different kinds of terms may have more or less accessible equilibria. 
Some terms may have very few, or perhaps no alternative equilibria, and for those terms 
the domain of application is indeed fixed once and for all: when the term is bestowed a 
meaning, there is only one possible history of correct application. 
 
Jackman’s view challenges the traditional view that would admit only one possible 
history of application compatible with a pre-established meaning in a further, more 
radical way. For on Jackman’s view we have to accept that future developments affect 
present and past practice. Jackman proposes a form of “temporal externalism” 
according to which “the future behaviour of an individual or his society can affect the 
content of his thoughts and utterances” (Jackman 199:160), a view that he sees in full 
consonance with the kind of externalism endorsed by Kripke, Putnam and Tyler Burge. 
On Jackman’s view, past applications of a flexible term (i.e., a term, for which there is 
more than one accessible equilibrium) t to a are de facto wrong if the subsequent history 
of the use of the term does not include a under the extension of t. It is not just that we, 
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present speakers, judge them as wrong: they are wrong because correctness of 
application, as well as the content of utterances and thoughts, is relative to the 
alternative histories of the use of the term. 
 
Jackman’s stance on the role of future facts on past performance is a bold step not 
intrinsically connected to the view that the semantics of some terms is flexible. One 
may be more inclined to take a position closer to LaPorte’s and accept that there is a 
certain level of indeterminacy as regards whether the application of t to a is consistent 
with the meaning of t, an indeterminacy that future practice resolves. Even if we deny it 
factual import, something like Jackman’s picture is useful to explain some of our 
attitudes towards past ways of applying terms and our tendency to judge as wrong an 
application of t to a by our ancestors, on the basis of future development or refinement 
in the application of a term. Even though the usage of some terms may well be flexible, 
once a possible history of usage gets consolidated, that form of usage becomes 
expansive towards the past: we tend to look at the past as if that form of application of 
the term had always been the only possibly correct one.  
 
Flexibility is time sensitive. We can see LaPorte’s history of how the meaning of a term 
is refined in its path from the vernacular domain to the scientific domain as a process of 
inflexibilization. Flexibility is also a matter of degree.  Some terms may be extremely 
flexible in that several different equilibria are compatible with continuous use. Other 
terms may simply be inflexible: only one linear history is compatible with the meaning 
of the term. Some scientific terms seem to be inflexible. For instance Nigel Sabbarton-
Leary (2010) has argued that the meaning of ‘tungsten’ is given by the description ‘the 
element with atomic number 74’; past, present and future uses of ‘tungsten’ correctly 
apply only to that substance. For semantically inflexible terms, the traditional strong 
and once-and-for-all interpretation of the principle that meaning determines reference 
does hold.  
 
It may seem that our argument supports the conclusion that all terms are flexible. Not 
so. It is important to distinguish here two issues. On the one hand any kind term could 
have been associated with a different extension. The sound ‘table’ could have been 
applied to tables and chairs, but that does not make the term flexible. The issue of 
flexibility comes up when there is a consistent and continuous practice of application of 
a term to a certain domain, and then the question arises as to whether the term is to be 
applied to an object or sample that is in some ways similar to, and in some other ways 
dissimilar from, members in the extension. In the case of ‘ave’ planes are similar to the 
objects the term had been always applied to, in that they fly; but they are dissimilar also 
since they are not living organisms. If the semantics of the term is flexible, the options 
of including or excluding the new objects from the extension are equally consistent with 
past usage. For an inflexible term, like ‘tungsten’,  the criteria are strict and no question 
arises. Whether the semantics of a term is flexible or inflexible depends on many 
factors, including the intentions and interests of the speakers, and what is at stake in 
keeping the extension fixed. Inflexibility is important for science. It helps explain why it 
makes sense to regard as wrong past applications of scientific terms in spite of radical 
changes in the theory. 
 
Admitting semantic flexibility invites the question as to what makes the history of the 
use of a flexible term go one way or another. LaPorte, focusing on pre-scientific uses of 
terms, suggests that it is the task of experts to push usage in a certain direction. But as 
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we will argue, a variety of factors do have an influence. Money, politics, social 
pressure, ethical considerations, the intelligence of a few actors with a capacity to move 
others to use words in one or another way, all may play a role in a phenomenon that is 
quite pervasive, as there are many terms with an arguably flexible semantics.  
 
Think, for instance, of e-sports. Video game competitions are nowadays a social 
phenomenon that brings together millions of players, and have become a business of 
great proportions. The interest those competitions raise has resulted in the participation 
of sponsors and the creation of an international federation. And there is an ongoing 
discussion as regards the recognition of e-sports qua Olympic sports for the Tokyo 
Games of 2020. In fact, since the end of 2017 the IOC has already recognized that they 
could be considered a sporting activity, highlighting features such as the intensity of the 
training which is comparable with traditional sports.5 
 
But of course, the decision by the IOC might go the other way. Decisions as regards 
application or non-application of terms to things often depend on which similar features 
end up being highlighted as relevant. And which features end up being highlighted as 
relevant is not a purely semantic issue. In this case, like in many others, there is little 
doubt that commercial impact, generational differences and changing social attitudes 
may, and probably do, play a role. 
 
This case highlights also that cashing out the addition of e-sports to the extension of 
‘sport’ as an evolution or refinement of the meaning of ‘sport’ as opposed to simply 
counting it (as Jackman would have it) as an alternative choice that entirely preserves 
the meaning of the term, is not an easy choice. Does classifying e-sports as sports 
constitute a precisification or refinement in the meaning of ‘sport’? It is tempting to say 
that it does, after all if we accept that the decision could go the opposite way we are 
implicitly accepting that before the decision it is indeterminate whether e-sports are or 
are not sports. In fact, a very common reaction among philosophers and non-
philosophers alike, is to express surprise that an activity such as playing video games 
can be considered a sport, and consequently the classification of the activity as a sport is 
viewed as stretching the meaning of ‘sport’. Stereotypes play a role in our judgments 
about meaning too. And the stereotype of the typical video game player, a kid 
permanently dressed in pyjamas, locked in their room all day and consuming cold pizza 
and Coca-Cola, does not invite an immediate connection to the (stereotypical) world of 
sports. But the stereotypes of darts and snooker, typical pub activities, do not invite 
such a connection either. Yet, snooker has been considered a sport for a long time and 
in fact it was a sport in the Paralympic Games from 1960 till 1988. And there are voices 
that claim the same destiny for darts.6 It is worth noting that in both cases, the 
emergence of sponsors, surely not a semantic matter, appears to have an influence in the 
classification. In any case, if darts and snooker are sports it is not entirely clear what 
stretch in the meaning of ‘sport’ including video games consists in.7 
 
5 See https://www.olympic.org/news/communique-of-the-olympic-summit, Jenny et al. 
(2017) and Pérez Triviño (2017). 
6 See http://www.rulesofsport.com/faq/is-pool-snooker-a-sport-or-a-game.html and 
http://www.rulesofsport.com/faq/is-darts-a-sport.html	
7 Unless of course one wishes to argue that any addition of a newly encountered or 
created thing or kind of thing, or any subtraction or a previously included item is a 
change in meaning. We do not think that such a strategy is well founded. As John Perry 
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A case that clearly highlights the interplay between semantic flexibility and inflexibility 
involves the dispute over same-sex marriage, a dispute that has occurred both in the 
street and in the law. Among supporters of same-sex marriage, the discussion has 
moved along two different lines. On the one hand we find those that, accepting that 
traditional marriage involves the union of woman and man, declare the traditional 
institution of marriage defunct and see the acceptance of same-sex marriage as the dawn 
of a new institution for which we may want to continue to use an old word with a new 
meaning. Thus, Brian Epstein (2015) states: 
 
At its core — in belief, in practice, in function and in law — the old institution 
of marriage applied exclusively to opposite-sex couples. Which is why the old 
institution is now being replaced with a better one [. . .] [T]he word “marriage” 
is now undergoing a reference change [. . .]  we are making a social decision to 
apply an old word to a new institution.   
 
On the other hand Adèle Mercier, who acted as expert witness in Canadian Courts, 
defending gay couples seeking the right to marry, considers in Mercier (2007) a 
semantic argument according to which the characteristic features that define a marriage 
(commitment to a life in common, respect, trust, etc.) are present in heterosexual as well 
as same-sex unions, in which case same-sex marriage would have always been under 
the extension of ‘marriage’.8 
 
Both argumentative lines subscribe to what we have termed here the inflexible stance: 
according to the first line of thought, it was determined by past uses of ‘marriage’ that 
same-sex unions did not fall under the umbrella of ‘marriage’, and hence a very 
welcome change in the meaning of the word occurred when same-sex marriage was 
legalized. According to the second line of thought same-sex unions had always been 
under the extension of marriage. 
 
Another way of looking at the issue is to consider ‘marriage’ as a term with a flexible 
semantics, in which case, adapting Jackman’s terminology, at the time same-sex unions 
came up for classification two relevant and different equilibria were consistent with the 
meaning of the term, one of them accepting the application of ‘marriage’ to same sex 
unions, and the other one restricting it to unions of woman and man. Social pressure 
and, in many countries, the decisions of judges, have moved towards the inclusion of 
same sex unions as marriages.9 Here too, the difference between an approach that   
cashes out the decision between alternative courses of action as a matter of 
precisification or refinement of meaning and an approach that is closer to Jackman’s 
temporal externalism is important in the assessment of past judgments about same sex 
marriage. For, given the actual history of the use of the term, a temporal externalist like 
Jackman would regard past uses by judges and other officials that denied the application 
of the term to same-sex unions as wrong, as always the facto wrong, for the reference of 
 
(2011) has argued, the addition of the red-eared frog to the list of endangered species 
does not alter the meaning of ‘endangered species’. 
8 This line of argument is not the one ultimately recommended by Mercier to be the 
basis for the judges’ decision. See Mercier (2007). 
9 An interesting issue has to do with whether judges can establish meaning. See Epstein 
(2015) for an argument against judges’ semantic authority. 
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their utterances, and the thoughts they expressed using the word ‘marriage’ were shaped 
by the future history of the use of the term. Had the history of the word been different, 
they would have been correct. Accepting, on the other hand, that flexibility entails a 
certain degree of indeterminacy, the response is rather that prior to the decision to settle 
on a given alternative consistent with past usage, there was no right or wrong as regards 
the meaning and the application of the term (which does not entail, obviously, that there 
was no right nor wrong judging the case from an ethical or social point of view). 
 
It is not our purpose here to discuss which of the ways of interpreting this and other 
situations is the correct one.10 As stated before, our main objective is to clarify a 
distinction in the mode of semantic operation of kind terms and to clarify also the 
commitments that the different positions espouse as regard the correctness or 
incorrectness of judgments about the application of terms to particular cases. 
 
Section 2. Tolerance 
 
Another relevant semantic distinction that is different from and orthogonal to the 
flexibility vs inflexibility contrast has to do with the acceptability of the co-existence of 
different uses of a given term that divide roughly the same domain of application in 
different ways. In cases in which two (or more) acceptable uses cohabitate, the different 
uses correspond intuitively to different meanings. But, as we will see, there are cases in 
which the cohabitation of different uses is not legitimized by the speakers’ community 
and is not even permissible from a semantic point of view. When different uses that are 
meant to apply to roughly the same domain, but that divide it in different ways, coexist 
in a community, we can say that the usage is tolerant.11 When coexistence of different 
practices of use is not tolerated we can say that the semantics of the term is strict. 
 
It is clear that the distinction between tolerant and strict usage differs from the 
distinction between flexible and inflexible semantics. The semantics of a use of a term t 
may be inflexible, in that it does not contemplate as continuous with the same meaning 
any expansion or contraction of the domain of application; and yet, other uses (flexible 
or inflexible) that do not apply t to a class of objects in the original inflexible extension 
of t, or vice versa, may be legitimized by the community and permitted by the otherwise 
inflexible semantics of (a usage of) t. A few everyday life examples will help bring the 
point home. 
 
Late in the 19th century merchants sought to recover taxes paid on tomatoes, arguing 
that tomatoes should be exempt of duty like all the other fruits. The case was heard by 
the US Supreme Court that in 1893 found in favor of the tax collectors and against the 
merchants (149 US 304, 1893). At the time everybody agreed, as we all agree 
nowadays, that tomatoes are botanically classified as fruits. But there was, and there is, 
a consolidated culinary use of words excluding tomatoes from the category of fruits. 
Justice Gray (cited by Phillips 2014: 381) wrote the opinion: 
 
10 Although the authors do have, of course, their own sympathies, not entirely consonant 
with one another. 
11 Again, as in the case of flexibility, it could be said that it is the community that is or 
is not tolerant in its usage. And, like in the case of flexibility the semantic impact of the 
attribution of tolerance or strictness should be clear, for the level of tolerance depends 
crucially, as we will see, on the intentions that bestow meaning on a term. 
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Botanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine just as cucumbers, 
squashes, beans and peas. But in the common language of the people, whether 
sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are vegetables which are grown in 
kitchen gardens, and which whether eaten cooked or raw, are, like potatoes, 
carrots, parsnips, turnips, beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery and lettuce, usually 
served at dinner in, with or after the soup, fish or meats which constitute the 
principal part of the repast, and not, like fruits generally, as dessert. 
 
The ruling does not strike us as mistaken even though, as we all learn in school, 
tomatoes are, botanically speaking, fruits. For it appeals to a use of the word ‘fruit’ 
common in 1893 and still well established today, even among botanists.12 
 
The intentions of speakers in introducing and using a term such as ‘fruit’ does not 
disallow the co-existence of the two practices of use, the two ways of using, or 
meanings of the word ‘fruit’ that cut the domain of application in different ways, as the 
culinary use excludes tomatoes from the extension of ‘fruit’ and the botanical use 
includes it.13 Our usage of ‘fruit’ is tolerant. Our acceptance of the culinary use shows 
that our application of terms for kinds of things is not always guided exclusively by the 
intention to capture the nature of kinds, and that we are not always committed to fall in 
line with scientific or expert uses. The use of 'fruit' is not underwritten exclusively by 
the fundamental intention by speakers to refer to a natural, botanical, category. 
 
Now, clearly the tolerance as regards the different uses of ‘fruit’ is independent of the 
inflexibility or flexibility of each of the uses. If Kripke and Putnam are right and 
scientific terms aim to capture the underlying essence of kinds, the botanical use of 
‘fruit’ is inflexible. Needless to say, the status of biological and botanical terms is hotly 
debated, and the Kripke-Putnam approach has been characterized as naive and 
inaccurate. But this is beside the point: even if the allegedly simplistic approach to 
biological kinds that Kripke and Putnam endorse were correct, and even if there is an 
underlying essence that all fruits share, an essence targeted by the botanical use of 
‘fruit’ (rendering the botanical use of ‘fruit’ inflexible), nothing follows from that 
inflexibility as regards the acceptability of the existence of a culinary use of the term 
‘fruit’.14 
 
12 An interesting question has to do with what makes one or the other use of ‘fruit’ 
correct in different contexts. That, we contend depends on all kinds of non-semantic 
factors, having to do with the broad context of use. But the issue is rather complex as it 
affects also the correctness of a judicial ruling. In the 1893 case it seems quite clear that 
the focus on the culinary use was sound. Had the dispute been about scientific issues, 
the appeal to the culinary use of ‘fruit’ might have been incorrect. We are not espousing 
here a robust conception of legal correctness, in the sense of Dworkin’s (1977) right 
answer thesis. We keep neutral between that approach and an approach closer to 
Kelsen’s (2005, chapter 8), a view that appeals only to the culturally acceptable 
character of interpretations in legal contexts.  
13 Some may argue that the phenomenon highlighted here is pragmatic, explained in 
terms of modulation or enrichment. Here we are taking a classical stance, and we regard 
the differences between different usages as semantic. 
14 Tolerance, like flexibility, is a time sensitive phenomenon. More than one use may be 
acceptable at a given point and not at another. It is interesting to note also that the 
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In contrast, the way some terms are used in a language simply precludes the 
acceptability of the coexistence of different uses and imposes a strict semantic mode of 
operation. In the past, patients in temporary cardiac arrest or people with severe cases of 
catalepsy that would have revived spontaneously were often pronounced dead. Many of 
them were buried or cremated. It was wrong to declare them dead, and those who made 
the pronouncement were making a mistake.15 Their application of the term was surely 
guided by the conception of death that was common currency at the time. But ‘dead’ 
meant, then and now, dead. 
 
As Michael Moore has pointed out: 
 
Both we and they [our ancestors] intended to refer to the thing, the naturally 
occurring kind of event, that death is. If they knew what we know about 
revivability of persons [ . . .], they would also say that such persons are not dead. 
They would say this because they, like we, intended to refer to a thing whose 
nature is partially known; and they, like we, would change the conventional 
indicators of when someone is dead whenever a better scientific theory comes 
along that demands that we do so. (Moore 1985: 297-298) 
 
The fundamental intention by speakers using ‘dead’ and ‘death’ has always been to 
refer to the real phenomenon of death, the irreversible cessation of vital functions, as 
indicated in the Uniform Determination of Death Act, even if conceptions of death and 
what being dead consists in have changed throughout history and have varied from 
community to community. It is crucial here to distinguish, as John Perry (2011) insists, 
the meaning of ‘dead’ and ‘death’ from the conception of death, the set of beliefs about 
the phenomenon that are commonly held at a given time. The meaning can be the same 
throughout time, even when conceptions change. This is what makes possible for people 
to disagree in their beliefs and yet be talking about and referring to the same thing.   
 
Undeniably, the intention to refer to the natural phenomenon, a phenomenon that we 
keep learning about, is guided by interest: we do not want to be pronounced dead unless 
we are really dead. And it is that fundamental intention that accounts for the stability of 
meaning throughout new discoveries and changes of stereotypes and beliefs about the 
phenomenon. The meaning or use of ‘dead’ and ‘death’ is strict, in that no other 
legitimate or acceptable usage or meaning, a use that cuts the same domain of 
application, organisms, in a different way is deemed acceptable. That acceptability is 
not a contingent societal matter: it is embedded in the semantics of the term, for it is 
constitutive of the intentions that govern the introduction and transmission of the use of 
terms, intentions that establish meaning. Whether usage is tolerant or strict depends on 
whether the intentions of the speakers in introducing a term and bestowing it a meaning 
exclude other uses.  
 
 
cohabitation of uses is not always peaceful, and often one use ends up prevailing while 
another one is abandoned. An illustration of this point is the case of the culinary use of 
‘fish’, a usage that included cetaceans in the past and that definitely excludes them in 
the present. 
15 This is not to say that they were legally at fault. They simply lacked the knowledge 
we possess now.  
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An important clarification is in order: first, it may seem that Moore's point depends on a 
counterfactual claim as to what our ancestors would have done were they to know what 
we know nowadays, and it is tempting to point out that there is no way to tell what 
people would or would not do as regards the continued application of a term. But in 
fact, Moore's point does not depend on a counterfactual. We know well what our 
ancestors actually did: they did "change the conventional indicators of when someone is 
dead" when "a better scientific theory" came along. But more importantly, the objection 
that our ancestors might have decided to use ‘dead’ even for those cases in which 
people were found to revive, perhaps accepting sentences such as ‘some dead people 
revive, but some stay dead’ misses an important point: that had our ancestors decided to 
use ‘dead’ for revivable cataleptic people or for people in cardiac arrest, we still would 
want to target the natural irreversible phenomenon that we intended to target when 
introducing ‘dead’ and ‘death’, that phenomenon whose occurrence justifies burying or 
cremating the dead. Had we not had a word for it, we would probably have invented it.16 
 
Consider also the expression 'human being'.  Whole communities in the past did not 
consider members of other races human beings. But independently of the conception 
people had of human beings, all human beings are and have always been under the 
extension of ‘human being’. Our use of the expression is strict, and no other use that 
leaves part of its extension out is tolerated by its very semantics.17 
 
Both ‘dead’ and ‘human being’ are high stakes expressions; their correct application is a 
matter of great importance, and this may be why accepting the coexistence of uses that 
include other things in the extension or that exclude portions of it is not tolerated, as 
those other uses may be frivolous, dangerous or damaging. The semantics of ‘dead’ and 
‘human being’ is not tolerant. 
 
It may be tempting to think that tolerance goes hand in hand with flexibility (and 
strictness with inflexibility). For instance ‘dead’, an expression used strictly, is, we 
surmise, clearly inflexible: at any point in time, using ‘dead’ to include people in 
reversible states is not a possible alternative continuous with the meaning of ‘dead’. 
 
But the two pairs of distinctions do not go hand in hand. As we have seen, the tolerant 
usage of ‘tomato’ does not exclude, in and of itself, regarding one of its uses, the 
botanical one, as inflexible (even if, as we noted, it is controversial how inflexible some 
scientific uses are) while regarding the other use, the culinary one, as flexible. In the 
culinary usage, whether items such as tomatoes or avocados are classified as fruits or 
vegetables may depend simply on the cuisine fashion set up by trendy chefs.  
 
As regards flexibility, the case of ‘human being’ is particularly complex. In the light of 
recent advances in the creation of artificial life, some may argue that we will soon be 
presented with a choice in the classification of certain beings as human, which would 
 
16 Surely there are other uses of ‘dead’ (‘dead battery’; ‘dead marriage’; ‘dead color’ . . 
.). We are interested here in the core meaning from which all those other uses have 
sprung metaphorically. The latter are, excuse the pun, dead metaphors.  
17 Could a group of people succeed in introducing an expression that separated some 
human beings from other human beings, and proceed to use it to discriminate against 
some groups? Unfortunately, yes, of course, they could. But (as we have argued in the 
case of ‘death’), it would not be our expression ‘human being’. 
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seem to suggest that there is a certain level of flexibility in the semantics of ‘human’. 
Others may argue that the term is inflexible: using ‘human being’ in the past to exclude 
members of some races was not a possible alternative continuous with the meaning of 
‘human being’; and as regards the future, right or wrong decisions may be made 
concerning the expression’s application, but there is an essence to humanity and hence 
it is determined whether a being is or is not human. The discussion of this issue and its 
ethical implications is well beyond the scope of this paper, but in either case, we think, 
the semantics of the expression is not tolerant: the cohabitation of uses that disagree in 
their inclusion or exclusion of certain groups of beings will not, and should not, be 
acceptable. 
 
Finally, although this is also controversial, we have seen that it is possible to regard the 
meaning of ‘marriage’ as flexible. And, at the same time it is clear that different uses, 
one that categorizes a union as marriage and another one that categorizes it as not 
marriage cannot officially coexist in a community. 
 
There may be disagreements as regards whether the terms we use here as illustrations 
are really instances of semantic flexibility, inflexibility, tolerance or strictness. This 
does not detract from the fact that the two pairs of distinctions are conceptually different 
and account for different explanations of the adequacy or inadequacy of the application 




In this paper we have discussed two orthogonal distinctions that concern the use and the 
mode of application of kind terms. On the one hand, we have argued, some terms are 
used flexibly, in that the domain of application of the term can expand or contract. The 
use of other terms is inflexible: the extension is fixed once and for all, and any change 
in the domain of application is an error or a clean break with past practice, with the 
subsequent emergence of a new usage. Whether a term is used flexibly or inflexibly 
depends on all kinds of factors and accidents surrounding the history of its use.  
 
On the other hand we have explored cases in which the cohabitation of two different 
uses of a kind term that divide roughly the same domain of application in different ways 
is tolerated, and we have distinguished those from cases in which only one use is 
accepted. 
 
The two pairs of distinctions account in different ways for the judgments of correctness 
or incorrectness of applications of terms, and thus they contribute to explain the source 
and import of some disagreements, both in everyday life and in the legal sphere.18 The 
dispute around whether tomatoes should be exempt of duty had to do with the 
acceptance of more than one use of the term ‘fruit’, not with whether alternative paths 
of use that expanded or contracted the domain of application were compatible with 
established usage. It is the question of tolerance that plays a role in the explanation of 
that dispute. On the other hand, the controversy around e-sports and the inclusion of 
 
18 It is worth stressing also that the distinctions are entirely independent of whether the 
theory of meaning endorsed is descriptivist or anti-descriptivist. For a discussion of how 
different theories of meaning account for legal disagreements see Martí and Ramírez-
Ludeña (2016) 
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video gaming under the umbrella of the term ‘sport’ is not a question about the 
acceptance of the cohabitation of different uses of the word ‘sport’ in the community. It 
has all to do with whether the inclusion of video games is consistent with the prior use 
of the term. Distinguishing the distinctions is important in order to provide adequate 
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